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PRESENTATION OF THE DEFENSE
THOMAS P. SULLIVAN*
Cross-examination to discredit the prosecution's
case will often narrow the field of uncertainties in
the mind of the trier of fact. Whatever belief of
guilt that remains in the wake of a successful series
of cross-examinations can be entirely extinguished
by the proper presentation of the defense. The ac-
cused is, of course, constitutionally permitted to
refrain from any action whatsoever in his own
behalf. But in the average case defense counsel ob-
tains an acquittal verdict by going beyond dis-
crediting the prosecution and presenting a case on
behalf of the defendant.
This article will concentrate on four significant
aspects of the defendant's case: (1) testimony of
the defendant; (2) alibi witnesses; (3) character
witnesses; and (4) scientific and demonstrative
evidence. Testimony in any of the four areas may
be sufficient to achieve acquittal; but, given a
particular set of facts, it is incumbent upon defense
counsel to strive for a proper balance of testimony
that, carefully presented to the trier of fact, com-
pels a not guilty verdict.
TE s OF Tm D=NDANT
In many cases, the most difficult question facing
defense counsel is whether he should advise his
client to take the stand. Counsel must carefully
evaluate the likely impact of both alternatives
upon the trier of fact, for this evaluation may well
be determinative of the outcome of the case.
When the client has confessed guilt to his at-
torney, it seems universally agreed that the at-
torney must encourage his client not to perjure
himself.1 However, if the client insists on testifying
* J.D. cure laude, Loyola University; Partner, Jenner
& Block, Chicago; Chairman, American Bar Associa-
tion Illinois Committee on Defense of Indigent Persons;
Member, Illinois State Bar Association Board of Gov-
ernors; Chicago Bar Association Committee on Defense
of Indigent Prisoners (Chairman 1958-59); Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in
Criminal Cases; Past Chairman, Chicago Bar Associa-
tion Committee on Operation of the Circuit Court of
Cook County; Fellow, American College of Trial Law-
yers. The author's other writings include, DEFENSE
oF Ca nm AL CASES (Practicing Law Institute 1964).
1 See, e.g., Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 Micn. L. REv. 1469, 1478 (1966), where the
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for strategic reasons or out of sheer callousness,
the attorney must decide if he will participate by
eliciting false testimony from his client2 and re-
ferring to it in the closing argument.8
One thesis proposes that the attorney proceed
with direct examination as if he had no knowledge
of his client's perjury because his withdrawl, at the
point of learning of the intended perjury, would
merely shift the problem to another counsel who
may never learn the truth of the matter 4 If counsel
learns of the intended perjury during the trial, his
ability to withdraw or restrain his questioning and
author notes that perjury may be tactically unwise as
well as morally improper.For an observation that the problem of the client's
prjury surfaces fairly often, see Reichstein, The
riminal Law Practitioner's Dilemma: What Should the
Lawyer Do When His Client Intends to Testify Falsely?,
61 J. Can. L.C. & P.S. 1, 9 (1970).
At the present time, a fierce debate rages over the
ethical duty of the lawyer in this situation. An analysis
of the arguments on either side of the debate is pre-
sented in Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, 79
YArm L. J. 359 (1970). Compare Freedman, supra note
1, at 1475-78 with Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy
and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MiciH. L. REv.
1485 (1966). See also Bowman, Standards of Conduct
for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An Attorney's
Viewpoint, 5 Am. Cans. L. Q. 28 (1966); Bress, Stand-
ards of Conduct of the Prosecution and Defense Function:
An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5. Am. Cans. L. Q. 23 (1966);
Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and De-
jense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am. CmM.
L. Q. 11 (1966); Starrs, Professional Responsibility:
Three Basic Propositions, 5 Am. CR 53. L. Q. 17 (1966).8In Johns v. Smyth, 176 F.Supp. 949 (E.D.Va.
1959), defendant was convicted of murdering a fellow
prison inmate. On petition for habeas corpus, the court
held that defendant had not been accorded a fair trial
because his representation by appointed counsel was
inadequate. Counsel was convinced at the trial of de-
fendant's guilt and failed to submit proposed jury in-
structions (which might have reduced the crime to
manslaughter) or to make a closing argument to thejury. The court said that complaints about trial tactics
usually have no merit, but in this case the attorney's
decisions were not tactical but were prompted by his
conscience. The court found the distinction critical:
The failure to argue the case before the jury, while
ordinarily only a trial tactic not subject to review,
manifestly enters the field of incompetency when
the reason assigned is the attorney's conscience.
Id. at 953. Starrs, supra note 2, at 19, feels that Johns
"establishes that where constitutional and ethical
values collide, the lawyer owes his first allegiance to the
Constitution."
4 Freedman, supra note 1, at 1476.
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argument without damage to the case is disputed.'
The argument sanctioning counsel's continued par-
ticipation in such situations is predicated on the
theory that defendant's failure to testify will in-
crease the likelihood of his conviction.' Therefore,
if counsel prevents his client from testifying merely
because defendant has confided his guilt, counsel
is violating a confidence by acting upon it to his
client's detriment. From these premises the argu-
ment concludes with the admonition that an at-
torney must put his client on the stand without re-
vealing guilt to the fact finder.7
A contrary view cautions that it is a violation of
professional ethics for a lawyer to knowingly pre-
sent false testimony in court.' Consequently, if
defendant insists upon taking the stand, his at-
torney may not conduct a direct examination in the
usual sense. Chief Justice Warren Burger outlined
his view of defense counsel's obligation on direct
examination thusly:
He should confine himself to asking the witness to
identify himself and to make a statement, but he
cannot participate in the fraud by conventional
direct examination. Since this informal procedure
is not uncommon with witnesses, there is no basis
for saying that this tells the jury the witness is
lying. A judge may infer that such is the case but
lay jurors will not.'
Defense counsel is offered no easy solution to this
dilemma when he knows the defendant intends to
commit perjury. Withdrawal in mid-trial, even if
permitted, may only assure a finding of guilty.
There is no pat answer to these delicate problems.
Fortunately, they do not frequently arise.
In the average case, the client insists upon his in-
nocence so that no direct admission from the de-
fendant is present to create ethical and moral
'Id. at 1477-78. One solution mentioned by Freed-
man would have defendant take the stand and testify
without assistance of his attorney. Bowman, supra note
2, at 30, agrees with Freedman that this solution is un-
satisfactory because it may prejudice the judge or jury:
I would be inclined to present his testimony in the
same fashion I would any other witness.... I do
not believe it is proper for defense counsel to pre-
sent the defendant's testimony in a fashion that
may lead the jury to conclude that counsel does not
believe his client.
6 Freedman, supra note 1, at 1475. See generally A.
AmsTERDAm, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, 2 TRIA. MANUAL
:FOR THE DEFENSE OF CsnuNAL CASES § 390 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as AisTEDDAm].7 Freedman, supra note 1, at 1477.
' Burger, supra note 2, at 12. The added gloss on this
position is occasioned by the fact that the view ad-
vanced is that of the Chief Justice of the United States.
9 Id. at 13.
problems for the lawyer. The defense attorney must
then engage in a delicate weighing of the considera-
tions, including, especially, the adverse effect upon
the trier of fact of the defendant's not testifying,
,whether or not the defendant will make a sympa-
thetic and believable witness, and whether the
defendant has a provable prior record.
While it is axiomatic that a defendant must be
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without
coercion to speak in his own behalf, a practical
question remains regarding the inference to be
drawn by the trier of fact from the defendant's
failure to take the stand. It is generally agreed that
if defendant does not testify, both judge and jury,
consciously or subconciously and despite law1" and
instructions n to the contrary, draw inferences ad-
verse to the defendant.- But the weight of this
adverse inference can be easily overestimated be-
cause defendant is entitled to jury instructions
regarding the burden of proof on the prosecution,
thepresumption of defendant's innocence, and that
no inference can be drawn from the accused's fail-
ure to testify." Judges are familiar with these
principles and attempt to apply them in reaching
their decisions.
In many cases, juries have acquitted defendants
ioSee Griffith v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965),
where the Supreme Court reversed a state conviction
because of comment in the prosecutor's dosing argu-
ment on defendant's failure to. testify. Mr. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, said that to allow com-
ment on the failure to testify would cut down the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion by making its assertion costly. Id. at 614. For a
discussion of comment on failure to testify, see B.
GEORGE, DEFENDING CRxnaAi CASES 75 (1969).
"See, e.g., IILINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.04 (1968):
The fact that [a] [the] defendant [s] did not
testify should not be considered by you in any
way in arriving at your verdict.
The committee note to the instruction declares it should
be given only at defendant's request and then it must
be given.
12 See, e.g., A.sTERDAm § 390, Freedman, supra note
1, at 1475; C. McCoRmcE, Evm33NcE § 43 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McComcxi]; 8 J. WIGMoR,
EVwENCE § 2272 (McNaughton ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WioRoox].IsSee, e.g., ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.03, 2.04 (1968). But cf. 8 WIGMoRE § 2272, where it is
suggested that the layman might view an exercise of
the privilege as an admission of guilt, but the silence
of the accused logically implies other things:
fear of exposure of matters related only remotely
to the charges, fear of impeachment by proof of
bad character evidence (especially prior convic-
tions), or fear that his demeanor on the witness
stand will do his innocence a fatal disservice.
For an early application of the rule that no inference
may be drawn from the failure to testify see Fitz-
patrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
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who did not take the stand. But it is difficult to de-
termine what inference, if any, the jury in a par-
ticular case will draw from the failure to testify, or
the effect that inference will have upon the jury's
verdict. 4
There are a number of factors which bear on
counsel's decision as to whether to advise the de-
fendant to take the stand. First, if an adequate
defense can be conducted without the defendant's
testimony because he has nothing to add to what
other witnesses have stated, the advantage in put-
ting the defendant on the stand is merely to erase
the possible adverse inference arising from his fail-
ure to testify. In a strong case for the defense or a
very weak case for the prosecution, the adverse
inference may not be substantial enough to warrant
the risa of subjecting defendant to a cross-examina-
tion.15
Second, the risk that defendant may falter on the
stand, particularly under cross-examination, must
be carefully considered. If defendant's testimony is
weak, there is a good chance he will be convicted
even though the prosecution's case is not strong.
The risk is not only that what defendant says is not
believable, but also that he may say it poorly or he
may simply exhibit a distasteful personality to the
fact finder. Defense counsel's task is to consider
defendant's personality and intelligence as well as
his story in determining how his client will react
when he takes the stand and is subjected to cross-
examination.'8
14 The jury may be swayed by the prosecutor who,
despite his inability to comment on the defendant's
failure to testify, may be permitted to make general
comments to the effect that "no one has denied" prose-
cution testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Broadherd,
413 F.2d 1361, 1363 (7th Cir. 1970); People v. Sibley,
93 Il.App.2d 38 236 N.E.2d 8 (19685; Tilford v. State,
437 P.2d 261 (Okia. Crim. 1968). But see Doty v.
United States, 416 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1968); Common-
wealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa. Super. 88, 233 A.2d 603
(1967) (holding flagrant abuses of the no comment rule
improper).
15 Although the usual rule is that the accused may
be cross-examined only as to the subjects dealt with on
direct, many courts allow the cross-examination to
cover the entire fact of guilt or innocence. 8 WiGMoRn
§ 2276. When the accused takes the stand, his status
as an accused is replaced by his status as a witness and
as a witness, his character may be impeached in various
ways. 8 Winmo § 2277.
16 See generally AusTERDAm § 390. Occasionally a con-
victed defendant seeks post-conviction relief on the
ground that his counsel was incompetent in not ad-
vising him to testify. However, most courts treat the
decision as a trial tactic and deny relief. See, e.g., Waltz,
Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation As A
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv.
289, 319 (1964); Comment, Quality of Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 8 Ana. L. REv. 484, 487 (1954); Polk
Third, if defendant has an admissible prior
criminal conviction, his credibility as a witness may
be impeached; 7 if he does not take the stand, prior
convictions are not admissible.18 The reason for
allowing evidence of prior convictions appears to
be to acquaint the jury with the witness' general
character and with his propensity to lie.19 Further,
allowing evidence of prior convictions may preju-
dice the defendant because the fact finder might
infer that one who has commited a crime in the
past is likely to do so again. This inference is par-
ticularly strong where defendant has previously
been convicted of the same type of crime as he is
currently charged with.20 Because evidence of prior
v. Bonnar, 336 F.2d 330, 332 (6th Cir. 1964); Newsom
v. Smyth, 261 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1958); Applica-
tion of Atchley, 169 F.Supp. 313, 317 (N.D.Cal. 1958).
17 8 Winmoa § 2277; McCopmcK § 43. See gen-
erally Comment, Impeachment of Defendant-Witnesses
by Prior Convictions, 12 ST. Louis U. L. J. 277 (1967).
18 There are many well recognized exceptions to the
general rule that evidence of prior convictions is inad-
missible unless the defendant takes the stand:
Evidence of other crimes is admissible when rele-
vant to (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of
mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes
so related to each other that proof of the one
tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity
of the person charged with the commission of the
crime on trial. When the evidence is relevant and
important to one of these five issues, it is generally
conceded that the prejudicial effect may be out-
weighed by the probative value.
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir.
1964). See also McBride v. United States, 409 F.2d
1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1969) (the general rule excludes
evidence tending to show defendant committed a crime
wholly separate from, independent of, and without any
relation to the case on trial); United States v. Harman,
349 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1965) (since defendant did
not testify or put his character in issue, evidence of a
prior conviction was inadmissible); Peeples v. United
States, 341 F.2d 60, 65 (5th Cir. 1965) (recognizing
exceptions to the general rule of nonadmissibility of
prior criminal acts when such evidence goes to issues
of identity, knowledge, or intent); Holt v. United
States, 342 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1965) (stating the general
rule that evidence of separate crimes is inadmissible,
with the exception that such evidence of closely con-
nected crimes is admissible to show a common scheme
or plan or to identify defendant); United States v.
White, 255 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1966) (admission of prior
conviction on offense unrelated to charge being tried,
held, reversible error). The exceptions may well swallow
the general rule of non-admissibility.
19 See Comment, supra note 18, at 277-78. The reason
for the rule is also given in Brown v. United States,
370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1967):
The reason for exposing the defendant's prior
record is to attack his character, to call into ques-
tion his reliability for truth telling by showing his
prior, relevant antisocial conduct.201In Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), defendant, charged with assault, had a prior
conviction for the same offense. The court held the prior
1971]
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convictions may be prejudicial and may work in-
justice if fear of impeachment keeps defendant
from telling his story, there is a trend in certain
federal courts to allow as evidence only those prior
convictions which are probative of defendant's
credibility.2
1
The leading case in this current trend is Luck v.
United Statesn where the court recognized the trial
judge's discretion to admit or withold evidence of
certain convictions where justice would be ad-
vanced by having the defendant testify rather than
remain silent for fear of impeachment and where
the "prejudicial effect of impeachment far out-
weighs the probative relevance of the prior con-
viction to the issue of credibility". 23
Luck's progeny24 culminated in the significant
decision in Gordon v. United States. 5 In Gordon,
Circuit Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger, reviewed
the Luck rationale and clarified the boundaries of
the trial court's discretion in admitting evidence of
convictions. Judge Burger distinguished convic-
tions which bear on a man's honesty and integrity
from convictions based on acts having no relation
to veracity, and suggested that evidence of the
latter should not be admitted. He also advised
trial judges to decide on admissibility in a non-jury
hearing before defendant takes the stand.2 6
conviction should have been ruled inadmissible because
its prejudicial nature outweighed its relevance to de-
fendant's credibility, and also because it was better to
rule out the conviction and have defendant take the
stand than to admit the conviction and force defendant
to remain silent. See also Gordon v. United States, 383
F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967).21 But see an example of the traditional view on ad-
missibility of convictions in State v. Hawthorne, 49
N.J. 130,228 A.2d 682 (1967). The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the trial judge who had refused to ad-
mit evidence of certain prior convictions because he
thought they were too remote and prejudicial. The
court construed the relevant statute to mean that the
trial judge must admit all previous convictions, al-
though the judge might call attention to the convic-
tions' remoteness when charging the jury.
n 3 48 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23 Id. at 768. The court also listed a number of factors
which might bear on the judge's discretion. Those in-
cluded the nature of prior crimes, the length of de-
fendant's criminal record, defendant's age and circum-
stances, and the extent to which it is more important
to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury
to hear defendant's story than to know of his prior
conviction.24See, e.g., Barber v. United States, 392 F.2d 517(D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d
328 (4th Cir. 1967); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d
936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown v. United States, 370
F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1029 (1968).26Id. at 941.
Gordon illustrates the enlightened view regarding
the admissibility of prior convictions for impeach-
ment purposes. While few state laws permit judicial
discretion in this regard, it is hoped that the federal
court decisions will initiate a sensible trend toward
exclusion of those convictions which are not proba-
tive of defendant's credibility.27 At this point,
however, confusion reigns.s
A final limitation posed upon the advisibility of
having the defendant take the stand is the risk of
removing the lid of Pandora's box in regard to sup-
pressed evidence. If illegally seized evidence or
inadmissible statements have been successfully
suppressed, there is a risk that this evidence may
be used to impeach defendant's testimony. The
rule of Walder v. United States25 governed the use
of illegal evidence for impeachment purposes until
expanded in Harris v. New YorkVO In Walder, de-
27There are some indications that change in this
area may be constitutionally compelled. Professors Kal-
yen and Zeisel report that 17% fewer defendants with
provable records take the stand than those who have
no "provables." H. KAIvEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE Assm.t-
cAN JuRY 146 (1966). Further, the rate of convictions
rises sharply if the jury knows or suspects defendant
has a criminal record. Id. at 160. Therefore it appears
that the defendant with a prior conviction is discour-
aged from testifying, thus raising issues as to his right
to testify on his own behalf, to a fair trial, and to equal
protection. See note, Constitutional Problems Inherent
in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidencefor the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the De-
fendant Witness, 37 U. CnqN. L. Rxv. 168 (1968);
Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 Cm. B.
REc. 303 (1960). But cf. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554, 564-65 (1967), where the Supreme Court showed
some reluctance to strike down state rules on constitu-
tional grounds.
The preliminary draft of the Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence for the United States District Courts and Magis-
trates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), reject the Luck test and
provides that any witness, including the defendant, may
be impeached by proof that he was convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.
Evidence of a conviction is inadmissible if more than
ten years has elapsed since the witness was released from
confinement, or the expiration of parole, whichever is
later.
2 See, e.g., the split decisions that have produced in-
ter-circuit division on the Luck-Gordon issue: United
States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 14, 18-19 (7th Cir. 1970)
(finding impeachment limitation to be contrary to es-
tablished law of circuit over opposition expressed by
Kiley J concurring); Bendelow v. United States, 418
F.2d 42 (Sth Cir. 1969) (split court permitting impeach-
ment with prior conviction for same offense although
conviction for another previous offense was available
for same purpose). See also United States v. Bailey,
426 F.2d 1236, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring & dissenting) ("Congress is seriously con-
sidering the modification or outright repeal of the Luck
doctrine.").
29 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
30 - U.S. - (1971).
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fendant had been indicted for purchasing and
possessing narcotics but the charge was dropped
when the evidence was suppressed. Two years later,
Walder was again indicted on a narcotics charge.
At his trial, he testified on direct examination that
he had never sold or possessed narcotics. When the
testimony was repeated on cross-examination, the
prosecution called on rebuttal one of the officers
who made the previous seizure from Walder to,
theoretically, impeach the defendant's credibility.
The United States' Supreme Court upheld the ad-
missibility of the testimony, noting that defendant
testified on direct as to matters collateral to the
issue of his own guilt or innocence. The Court also
appeared to distinguish the situation where illegally
obtained evidence is used to rebut defendant's
denial of guilt as opposed to his denial of col-
lateral matters." Therefore, the Walder rule ap-
peared to protect defendants from impeachment
by illegally obtained evidence unless he testified
to collateral matters on direct examination
3 2
In Harris, the Supreme Court extended the
Walder rationale by holding that trustworthy
statements suppressed under the technical ramifi-
cations of Miranda v. Arizona;3 may be used to
impeach defendant's testimony on matters directly
related, not merely collateral, to defendant's guilt.
Harris took the stand to testify in his own defense
and on cross-examination was asked if he had made
certain statements to the police. The questions
and answers were recited by the prosecutor even
though the statements were inadmissible under
Miranda. The Court agreed that Walder could be
distinguished, but was of the opinion that:
The impeachment process here undoubtedly pro-
vided valuable aid to the jury in assessing peti-
tioner's credibility.. ;4
Thus, Harris further complicates defense counsel's
31347 U.S. at 65-66. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the
majority, stated:
He must be free to deny all the elements of the case
against him without thereby giving leave to the
Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evi-
dence illegally secured by it, and therefore not
available for its case in chief.
Id. at 65.32 See AwsTEan Am § 390.
33384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda, one of the most
famous decisions of the Warren Court in the area of
criminal justice, held inadmissible confessions made
without prior warning of constitutional rights.
- U.S. --, - (1971). See Cole, Impeachment with
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Coming to Grips
with the Perjurious Defendant, 62 J. Camn. L.C. & P.S.
1 (1971).
decision to allow the defendant to testify. If the
defendant has made any statements to the author-
ities, even though illegally obtained, they may now
be used on cross-examination to impeach defend-
ant's testimony. 5
The limitations circumscribing the advisability
of permitting the criminal defendant to take the
stand in his own behalf are plentiful. They are high-
lighted and emphasized here to illustrate that
defense counsel should think long and hard about
the alternatives before permitting his client to
take the stand.
Usually, the decision as to whether to advise the
defendant to testify cannot be made with finality
until after the prosecution has closed its case, and
often not until after other defense witnesses have
testified. This must be borne in mind by defense
counsel when conducting voir dire examination and
in making his opening statement, because if he
commits the defendant to taking the stand before
proof begins, he may find himself seriously embar-
rassed if he later decides to advise the defendant
against testifying.
It is the author's personal view that more cases
are lost because the defendent does testify than
are lost because he does not testify. This view, of
course, is subject to Justice Holmes' famous dictum
that "To generalize is to omit." 36
Ami WiTNEssEs
An alibi in the context of criminal law is the de-
fendant's claim that he was elsewhere than at the
scene of the crime.P The theory of the claim is
rooted in the essential inconsistency between the
defendant's asserted whereabouts and the prose-
cution's allegations that the defendant was present
at the crime.3 One of the most frequent defenses
35Justice Brennan, speaking for three of four dis-
senters in Harris, pointed out that the new rule will
likely color defendant's choice as to whether he should
testify. Since he will be encouraged not to testify if he
has made a statement, his free choice in the matter is
impaired. If he does not testify, he of course risks the
adverse inference customarily drawn by the trier of fact
when defendant fails to take the stand.36Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208
U.S. 267, 273 (1908).
37 "Alibi" is a Latin term meaning elsewhere. See
State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 388, 221 A.2d 199, 204(1966); State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 431, 136 A.2d 761,
765 (1957).
38A significant ramification of the theory underlying
an alibi defense concerns its admissibility at trial. It has
been held that for the alibi to be admissible it must be
such "as absolutely to preclude the possibility of pres-
ence at the alleged time and place of the act." 1 WiG-
moan §136. Compare People v. Gasior, 359 Ill. 517, 195
1971]
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in criminal cases, though perhaps the easiest to
manufacture, 39 a strong alibi presents the prosecu-
tion with a formidable task of refutation."0
In light of the frequency and abuse of the alibi
defense and the procedural obstacles which pre-
vent the prosecution from effectively meeting the
evidenciary effect of suddenly introduced alibi
testimony,41 many states have enacted alibi-notice
statutes requiring, at minimum, notice prior to trial
that the defense proposes to present an alibi de-
fense.O In addition to notice most statutes require
N.E. 10 (1935) with People v. Russell, 266 N.Y. 147,
194 N.E. 65 (1934).39 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970)
(state interest in protecting itself against easily fabri-
cated, eleventh hour alibi defense was both obvious and
legitimate); Epstein, Advance Notice of Alibi, 55 J.
Cans. L.C. & P.S. 29, 31 (1969).
40 A strong alibi may theoretically be distinguished
from other types of alibi as erecting an absolute defense
to the allegations of a prosecution in a manner which
would preclude the logical or physical possibility of both
the alibi's circumstances and the allegation's circum-
stances being true. See 1 WIGmoRE §136. More prac-
tically, the absolute, "airtight" or "ironclad" alibi de-
fense differs from other alibis in weight or degree, de-
riving its potency from the effect of its proof on the
jury. There are, however, many instances of so-called
ironclad alibi defenses which have suffered total destruc-
tion as a result of a cross-examination which exposed a
circumstantial loophole in the alibi's argument, thus
rendering possible the accused's presence at the scene
of the crime. See generally, C. FRIcxE, CRImNAL IN-
VESTIGATION 24 (1949).
Note that an alibi defense is not conclusive if the
charge is that the defendant committed the crime
through an agent. See Tomlinson v. United States, 93
F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1937); State v. Ross, 92 Idaho
709, 449 P.2d 369 (1968); H. C. UNDERmL, CRuOiNAL
EVIDENCE §410 (5th ed. 1956). See generally T. HOUSEL
& G. WALSER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES §455 (2d ed. 1946).41 For example, the effect of surprise on the prosecu-
tion when alibi testimony is introduced may require a
continuance to permit the prosecution to prepare a re-
buttal. One state supreme court expressed a purpose of
its alibi-notice statute as avoiding "surprise at trial by
the sudden introduction of a factual claim which cannot
be investigated unless the trial is recessed to that end."
State v. Garvis, 44 N.J. 268, 272-73, 208 A.2d 402, 404
(1965). Furthermore, the fact that the prosecution may
obtain a continuance subsequent to surpise defense tes-
timony will not correspondingly assure that it can in
fact adequately investigate the elements of the alibi in
order to attack the defense.
This difficulty ordinarily exists where the defense
of alibi is first disclosed when the defense puts on
its evidence at the trial, when it is generally too
late to check on the alibi and secure evidence which
will disprove it. FRICEE, supra note 40, at 24.
42See e.g. AIZ. R. Crun. P. 192 (B); FLA. R. CruM.
P. 1.200; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §114-14 (1969); IND.
Am. STAT. §§9-1631 9-1633 (1956); IOWA CODE ANN.
'§777-18 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. A N. §62-1341
(1964); Mica. STAT. ANN. ch. 28 §1043 (1956); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §630-14 (1947); N. J. R. Ca=s. P. 3:5-9
(1958); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §2945.58. (1964); N. Y.
the location and circumstances of the alibi and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom
the defendant will rely in adducing his alibi. In
Williams v. Florida" the Supreme Court preserved
the constitutionality of this rudimentary criminal
discovery procedure45 in the face of strong charges
of fifth and fourteenth amendment violations."
CODE CanM. PRoc. §295-L (McKinney 1958); OxRA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 22, §585 (1969); PA. R. Crui. PRAc.
312 (Supp. 1970); S. D. Com'. LAWS §23-37-5 (1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. §7-22-17 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§6561-6562 (1959); Wis. STAT. ANN. §955.07
(West 1958).
43 See generally Epstein, supra note 39, at 35. Seven
states require that the prosecution be apprised of the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the
defendant will rely in proving his alibi: Ariz., Iowa,
Kan., Mich., N.J., N.Y., Wis. See note 42 supra. Note
that the general requirement of notice to the prosecu-
tion of an alibi defense together with information of
any particulars does not require the defense in fact to
present an alibi defense at trial.
In general, the failure to call a potential alibi witness
may subject defendant to the risk of prosecutorial com-
ment on the failure at trial. Where the witness is equally
available to both defense and prosecution, there is a
split of authority in regard to the permissible inferences
that can be drawn by the jury from the failure to pro-
duce the witness. See United States v. Dibrizzi, 393
F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1968), for recent authority permitting
a jury to infer that testimony would have been un-
favorable to one of the parties. See generally Comment,
Permissive Inference from the Non-Production of Equally
Available Witnesses, 73 DicK. L.R. 337 (1969). Support-
ing the view that a prosecutor may not comment on the
failure of the defense to introduce testimony supporting
an alibi after statutory notice of an alibi defense, see
People v. Mancini, 6 N.Y.2d 853, 188 N.Y.S.2d 559,
160 N.E.2d 91 (1959); State v. Cocco, 730 Ohio App.
182, 55 N.E.2d 430 (1943).
jurisdictions which have enacted alibi-notice statutes
differ in the sanctions they prescribe for failure to ob-
serve the notice requirements. In most, the trial judge
is permitted the discretion to exclude alibi testimony
altogether. For the converse situation where the de-
fendant complies with the requirements of the alibi-
notice statute but the state does not, see State v. Bald-
win, 47 NJ. 379, 221 A.2d 199 (1966).
44399 U.S. 78 (1970).
4 For a general commentary on Williams see Su-
preme Court Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 170-71 (1970)
(examining the case's impact on the validity of rule
16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure);
Supreme Court Review: Jury Trial, 61 J. CaIs. L.C. &
P.S. 526 (1970). For an indepth examination of the ef-
fectiveness of alibi-notice statutes and an argument for
their employment, see Epstein, supra note 39, at 31.
Reasons favoring the adoption of an alibi rule as a dis-
covery device include the fact that it prevents surprise
to the prosecution, it deters the use of a fabricated alibi
defense, it saves time and money by avoiding the need
of a costly continuance and halting the prosecution of
cases where the state, through a timely investigation,
discovers the legitimacy of the alibi defense. Signifi-
cantly, the statute promotes respect for the alibi de-
fense actually used at trial.
46 See 399 U.S. at 106 (Black & Douglas, J. J., dis-
senting). The Court rejected the fifth amendment
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It is a common misconception that the strength
of the alibi defense is directly related to the number
of witnesses called. In most cases the quantity of
witnesses testifying for the defense is of minor
importance; it is rather the quality of the witness
that is vital to the successful alibi defense. A long
series of witnesses testifying to events in support of
a defendant's alibi, where their interest in the
outcome of the cause is apparent, may not dis-
charge the defendant's burden of proving the
alibi.47 Moreover, unconvincing alibi testimony,
charge of violation of self-incrimination by holding that
the notice requirement did not compel testimony at
trial, that the state could achieve the same ends in any
event through a continuance, and that the notice re-
quirement can only serve to jeopardize the fabricated
alibi 399 U.S. at 82-86. The Court also noted that the
fifth amendment privilege was historically related to
the facts of a crime and not to the strategy at trial.
399 U.S. at 86 n. 17.
Confronted with the question whether the Florida
statute violated the defendant's right to due process
under the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that
the state had a compelling and legitimate interest in
preventing the introduction of fabricated defenses at the
"eleventh hour". 399 U.S. at 81. Furthermore, the
defendant was accorded the reciprocal right under the
Florida law of acquiring upon demand a list of the
names and addresses of witnesses the state proposed to
offer to discredit defendant's alibi on rebuttal. The
Court expressly emphasized that it was not confronted
with the question whether-the absence of a provisiongranting the defendant reciprocal discovery against the
state would affect the Court's disposition of the due
process issue.399 U.S. at 82 n. 11. In light of the fact that
most of the jurisdictions that have enacted alibi-notice
statutes have no such reciprocal discovery provisions,
one may anticipate further challenges to the validity of
the statutes.
See People v. Eubank, 46 Il.2d 383, 393-94, 263
N.E.2d 869, 875-76 (1970), upholding the Illinois alibi
statute in reliance upon Williams.
479 WIGmo E §2512; UND RBML, supra note 40, at
§441. It is generally conceded that the accused does
not have the ultimate burden of proving an alibi.
Thomas v. United States, 213 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.
1954) (no burden of proof on the accused regarding
alibi defense); People v. Pearson, 19 Ill.2d 609, 169
N.E.2d. 252 (1960) (disapproving jury instruction
erecting burden of proof such that alibi must make it
"impossible or highly improbable" that defendant
committed crime); State v. Spencer, 256 N.C. 487,
124 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1962) (reversing and finding de-
fendant entitled to instruction that reliance on an alibi
does not raise the burden of proving it); Mullins v.
Commonwealth, 174 Va. 472, 5 S.E.2d 499 (1939)
(defendant does not have to prove any fact beyond a
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evi-
dence). But see State v. Stump, 454 Iowa 1181, 119
N.W.2d 210 (1963) (issue of alibi is affirmative defense
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of the pre-
ponderance of the evidence). While the true purpose
of an alibi defense is to demonstrate the impossibility
of defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, the
failure to establish it does not preclude the jury from
considering the evidence without regard to the alibi
and determining whether it raises a reasonable doubt
revealed through cross-examination s or on the
state's rebuttal,49 can taint or even be fatal to an
of defendant's guilt. See McCool v. United States,
263 F. 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1920). Compare Doyle v. State,
166 Ark. 505, 266, S.W. 459 (1924) (defendant must sus-
tain alibi by evidence which raises reasonable doubt);
People v. Mercer, 103 CaLApp.2d 782, 230 P.2d 4
(1951) (burden on defendant to prove alibi to such a
degree of certainty as would raise a reasonable doubt);
Ingram v. State, 144 Fla. 714, 198 So. 464 (1940) (not
essential to prove alibi conclusively, but sufficient to
raise reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Gates, 392
Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958) (upholding jury instruc-
tion placing upon defendant the burden of proving his
alibi to the satisfaction of the jury). See also Common-
wealth v. Narnak, 357 Pa. 391, 406, 54 A.2d 865, 872(1947) (disapproving anomalous alibi instruction charg-
ing jury that if defendant is to avail himself of alibi
defense he must prove it by fair preponderance of evi-
dence, but failing this, the jury must nonetheless acquit
him if the evidence raises reasonable doubt of guilt).
Where the evidence of the prosecution makes a clear
case against the defendant, proof of an alibi must be
clear and satisfactory. I. MooR., CmuNAm . LAW AND
PRocEDuRE, §1352 (3d ed. 1932).48See Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304
(1900), where the Court affirmed the trial court's over-
ruling of defense counsel's objections to the scope of
defendant's cross-examination and held that where a
defendant waives his privilege of silence and makes a
statement on his own behalf, the prosecution "has a
right to cross-examine him upon such statement with
the same latitude as would be exercized in the case of an
ordinary witness". Id. at 315. See also Bram v. United
States, 226 F.2d 858 (8th. Cir. 1955) (approving cross-
examination for discovery of bias, prejudice, sympathy,
or interest in favor of defendant); People v. Brazil,
53 Cal. App.2d 596, 128 P.2d 204 (1942); State v.
Latham, 131 La. 533, 59 So. 981 (1912) (permitting
cross-examination of alibi witness as to his knowledge
of defendant's whereabouts before and after the com-
mission of the crime); State v. Cooper, 26 Wash.2d
405, 174 P.2d 545 (1947) (holding no abuse of discre-
tion in permitting cross-examination of alibi witness
for purpose of showing hostility toward prosecuting
attorney).
4The state has generally been permitted a wide
scope of possible rebuttal to alibi testimony. Compare
People v. Thomas, 7 Ill.2d 278, 131 N.E.2d 35 (1956)
(permitting introduction of state's evidence in rebuttal
though such evidence could have been admitted "in
chief") with People v. Williams, 164 Cal.App. 285, 330
P.2d (1958) (disapproving prosecution practice of with-
holding part of its case for rebuttal, but holding that
prosecution had made clear case before rebuttal). See
also Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895)
(where alibi testimony asserted that defendant was
many miles away on a public road during the commis-
sion of the crime, and that the country was covered
with wire fences, it was competent to offer rebuttal
that the accused possessed wire cutter); United States
v. Guido, 251 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1958) (approving rebut-
tal); State v. Jackson, 336 Mo. 1069, 83 S.W.2d 87(1935) (permitting prosecution to denounce alibi wit-
ness's testimony as perjured in argument subsequent to
state's witness's rebuttal testimony); Commonwealth
v. Ricci, 161 Pa.Super. 193, 54 A.2d 51 (1947) (approv-
ing weak rebuttal testimony to issue collateral to alibi'
defense); Miller v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 640, 146,
S.W.2d 392 (1941) (in robbery prosecution, approving,
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otherwise convincing defense.50 It is thus incum-
bent upon defense counsel to exercise extreme
caution when choosing the witnesses upon whom
he will rely to establish the alibi defense. Through
early investigation and interviewing, counsel
must take pains to assure that the prospective
trial testimony of each alibi witness will corre-
spond to the accounts he expects to elicit from
other defense witnesses. 51 Ultimately, it is up to
defense counsel to make a judgment as to whether
or not an alibi defense should be presented.2
Once the decision to go forward with the alibi
has been made, defense counsel must decide which
witnesses to call in an effort to sustain the alibi.
Alibi witnesses may be classed in two general
categories: those who are relatives or friends of the
accused or otherwise apparently interested in the
outcome of the case,5 and those who are not. Wit-
rebuttal that another robbery had taken place the same
night where property taken from other robbery was
circumstantially traced to defendant's possession);
State v. Anderson, 46 Wash.2d 864, 285 P.2d 879(1955) (permitting rebuttal attacking collateral issue).50 See, e.g., Keys v. Dunbar, 229 F.Supp. 703, 705(E.D.Pa. 1964) (counsel's discretion in determining
whether to attempt an alibi defense upheld).
51 See AsTERDnm §402:
A defensive case that appears beautiful in pros-
pect may be crippled by unexpected testimony of
a defense witness. The best safeguard against this
is careful preparation and the taking of signed
statements from the witnesses.
02 Defense counsel's failure to raise an alibi defense
has occasioned charges of counsel's incompetency and
ineffectiveness violating the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to the assistance of counsel. However, courts
seem unwilling to give such charges vindication. See,
e.g., Curtis v. State, 450 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. 1970).
The rationale for refusing such claims is well articu-
lated in Keys v. Dunbar, 229 F.Supp. 703, 705 (E.D.Pa.
1964):
There are so many things for a trial lawyer to
evaluate, many of which are never available in any
record, that it is impossible for a court to determine
the validity of the reasons for his judgment. In
many instances, merely talking to a witness for a
short time will disclose that the witness' attitude,
demeanor, or manner is such that if called it might
well cause the loss of the case. For example, a wit-
ness may have been convicted of several felonies
or have been involved so closely with the defendant
that a most cursory cross-examination would not
only destroy the witness but injure the defendant's
case. Furthermore, one or several interviews with
the defendant himself may disclose to the trial
counsel that, if the defendant were called as a wit-
ness, he would convict himself. ... There appears
good reason for the rule that an attorney's conduct
must be so incompetent as to make the trial farce.
51 As bearing on credibility, the relations of a witness
with, or his feelings toward, another party may be
shown on cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v.
Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
906 (1967) (repulsed homosexual advances made on
defendant permissible to show witness's bias); Maples
nesses falling within the second category are both
rarer than the related or outcome-interested wit-
nesses and usually more valuable. Since the alibi
testimony of friends or relatives of the defendant
precipitates immediate suspicion in the trier of
fact,s the determination to use such testimony
should follow a thorough and critical interview of
the prospective witnesses. 0 The witnesses should
be presented only after defense counsel is per-
suaded that they are believable and can weather
cross-examination.
6
Another critical index of the quality of an alibi
defense concerns the extent of contact between
the alibi witness and the defendant during the time
of the commission of the crime. If the witness and
the defendant were together for the duration of
time covering the circumstances of the crime, or
alternatively, if a number of disinterested persons
are available to testify to the defendant's partici-
pation in or conspicuous presence at another place,
acquittal should result, for the "most determined
prosecutor could hardly hope to obtain or sustain a
conviction in the face of such testimony." 17 More
problematical is the casual encounter between the
prospective alibi witness and the defendant; evi-
dence of this nature is subject to various deficiencies
v. State, 44 Ala.App. 491, 214 So.2d 700 (1968) (holding
reversible error to deny cross-examination attempting
to ascertain interest, bias, prejudice or partiality on
matters testified to); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.2d 765,
73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106 (1968) (testimony show-
ing the bias of another witness admissible); People v.
Rainford, 58 IllHApp.2d 312, 208 N.E.2d 314 (1965)
(holding error to cut off all inquiry into bias in cross-
examination); Commonwealth v. Douglas, 354 Mass.
212, 236 N.E.2d 865 (1968) (upholding propriety of
cross-examination attempting to ascertain witness's
credibility by showing fear of another); People v.
Moore, 23 App.Div. 2d 854, 259 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1965)(holding reversible error to instruct jury to disregard
testimony elicited from complaining witness regarding
past hostility towards defendant).
' "In the case of testimony involving almost any
issue, the fact that a witness is interested in the out-
come of the case weakens its probative force." 10 PRooF
or FAcTs 33 (1961).5 5 See generally J. APPLEMAN, PREPARATION AND
TIAL 65-155 (1967); W. PIERSON, THE DEPENSE
ATroRNY Am BAsic DEFENSE TACTICS §74-98 (1956)
(exhaustive treatment of the considerations and prac-
tice of interviewing witnesses before trial).
66 For interesting samples of trial cross-examination
illustrating the destructive force upon alibi testimony,
see 3 F. BuscH, LAW AND TAcTIcs IN JuRY TRIALs
§410 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BuscH]. For demon-
stration materials on alibi testimony, see PRACTICING
LAW IN SnT ITE, SECOND ANNUAL CnaxIAL ADVOCACY
INST TUTE 63-138 (B. George ed. 1969).
073 BuscH §410. The relevance of evidence sought
to support such an alibi defense is outlined in UNDER-
HII., supra note 40, at §443.
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requiring a particularly sensitive assessment of the
prospective witness' ability and reason to recall
the encounter.8 The key to establishing credible
alibi testimony of this nature is to 'have the wit-
ness relate why he remembers being with the
defendant" 51 at the specific time and place of the
encounter. 0
Alibi witnesses are often honest, but simply mis-
taken as to the time or nature of their meeting
with the defendant because the circumstances are
such that the meeting was only a casual encounter
occurring months before trial. Consequently,
counsel must elicit some collateral event which
would help certify the time and place of the en-
counter and the reason for the witness' recollection
of it in an attempt to overcome the incredibility of
the testimony resulting from the temporal remote-
ness of the encounter." This problem can often
be reduced by investigation promptly after the
date of the crime. To insure that the alibi witness
58See A. Coanmrzus, CROSS-EXAMINATION or Wri-
NEssEs 150 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Coi-NELms]:
Why is it that this witness remembers meeting
this particular individual on the day in question
and why is it that the witness remembers that he
saw the accused on any certain day of the month
so long a time ago? It is wholly unnatural for any
individual to think back say to any definite Sunday
or any other given day of the week, months previ-
ous, and remember whom he saw on that date,
unless there was a special set of circumstances to
have impressed his mind.
19 See A sExRa As §407.
IGIt has been suggested as a practical matter that
defense counsel:
should lead up to the date of the alibi by develop-
ing the relationship between the defendant and the
witness, and when during the course of a month
(or within the appropriate pattern of their rela-
tionship) they see one another. Counsel may then
move to the month of the crime; pinpoint some-
thing unusual or significant that happened during
that month; then focus on the day of the crime,
relating the date and time to the significant hap-
pening just described and to the pattern of the
witness's daily routine and/or relationship with
the defendant.
Id. at §409.
61It is generally held that the jury may not be in-
structed to carefully scrutinize evidence of alibi be-
cause of the prevalence of fabrication and mistake in
alibi testimony. See eg., Johnson v. State, 24 Ala.App.
291, 135 So. 592 (1931) (error to instruct jury that
alibis are easily manufactured); People v. Costello,
21 Cal.2d 760, 135 P.2d 164 (1943) (suggestion may
not be made that jury must give less credit or more
careful scrutiny to testimony of alibi witnesses, or less
weight than to other evidence in case); People v.
Robins, 242 App.Div. 516, 275 N.Y.S. 940 (1934)(holding prejudicial error to charge jury that alibi
defense should be looked on with suspicion). Compare
State v. Wren, 194 Iowa 552, 188 N.W. 697 (1922),
a.f'd. per cur-jam, 263 U.S. 688 (1923); Bolin v. State,
219 Tenn. 4, 405 S.W.2d 768 (1966).
will be able to recollect the original circumstances
and stand by his testimony under the pressure of
cross-examination, counsel must thoroughly and
critically interview his witness prior to trial.
Should counsel detect retraction or incredulity, he
is advised to refrain from calling the witness.
Because of these risks of unreliable and changed
testimony, and particularly in jurisdictions where
alibi-notice statutes have been enacted,2 defense
counsel is well advised to -conduct interviews of
prospective alibi witnesses in the presence o a
third person and a court reporter and to secure
signed statements whenever possible. 3
Theoretically a sound alibi defense does more
than cast doubt on the prosecution's case; it af-
firmatively establishes the defendant's innocence.
To this extent the function of the character witness
is similiar. However, while the alibi witness demon-
strates that given the time of the crime, the
defendant was not at the place where the crime
was committed, the character witness demonsrates
that, given the nature of the crime, the defendant
was neither of the temperament nor the station to
commit it.
CHAnRCmR WINESSES
In too many instances, the testimony of so-
called character witnesses is treated perfunctorily64
and is not properly emphasized by the defense
counsel. Carefully selected, properly prepared and
62This caution follows, of course, because of the
likelihood that the prosecutor or his agent will inter-
view the prospective alibi witness subsequent to the
defense counsel's initial investigation. The subtle
pressures that the subsequent interview may bring to
bear on the witness may disturb the certainty of the
witness's recollections and engender changed testimony
at trial.
6In legal theory, the failure to sufficiently prove a
defense of alibi does not jeopardize the defendant's
case. Thus, the mere failure to substantiate the de-
fense of alibi may not be used to discredit the presumed
innocence of the defendant. See, e.g., Asher v. State,
201 Ind. 353, 168 N.E. 456 (1929) (holding error to
instruct jury that alibi defense found false could be
considered a discrediting circumstance in determining
defendant's guilt); People v. Rabinowitz, 290 N.Y.
386, 49 N.E.2d 495 (1943) (holding prejudicial error to
instruct that if jury rejected alibi it would logically
accept testimony of state's witnesses); State v. Ma-
rasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933) (discredited
alibi claim may not be transformed into affirmative
proof connecting accused with the commission of the
crime).
6The witness is placed on the stand, asked a few
questions about himself, whether he knows the de-
fendant and his reputation concerning the character-
istics involved in the case and, finally, to relate his
knowledge of the defendant's reputation.
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presented, character witnesses can be a, highlight
of the defense testimony.65
Character cgnsists of those qualities winch make
up an individual; it describes what a persormis.
,Reputation is the sum of the opinions entertained
concerning an individual; it describes what people
fthink he is.61 In order to prove. character, when
circumstantially relevant,n7 the testimony must
65 This is especially true when coupled with a jury
instruction such as that found in Illinois:
The defendant has introduced evidence of his
reputation for (e.g., truth and veracity-morality
-- chastity-hnesty and integrity-being a peace-
ful and law-abiding citizen, etc.). This evidence
may be sufficient when considered with the other
evidence in the case to raise a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt. However, if from all the evi-
dence in the case you are satisfied beyond a reason-
able doubt of the defendant's guilt, then it is your
duty to find him guilty, even though he may have
a good reputation for
ILLINOIs PATTERN JuRy INsTRUcTIONs §3.16 (1968).
The 'comment to this instruction states that unless
granted express recognition by the court, reputation
testimony would be largely ignored by the jury. See
People v. Hrdlicka, 344 IIl. 211, 220-21, 176 N.E. 308,
312-13 (1931).
. Generally, the defendant has the legal right to have
the jury instructed to consider all the evidence in the
case, including evidence of good character, in determin-
ing his guilt or innocence. Two commentators, how-
ever, see the better rule as allowing an instruction to
the effect that evidence of the defendant's good char-
acter, standing alone, is sufficient to create a reasonable
,doubt. See F. L. BA=Y & H. ROTHBLATT, DETENDING
Busnmss An Wnrar CoLL A"Causs §§212, 447
'(1969) [hereinafter cited as BAmiEA.
66 See generally Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D.
161, 227-32 (1969):
Rule 4-04. Character Evidence Not Admissible to
Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of
a person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of his char-
acter or a trait of his character offered by an ac-
cused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecu-
tion to rebut the same; • *
Rule 4-05. Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which
evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testi-
mony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in
which character or a trait of character of a person
, is an essential element of a charge, claim, or de-
fense, proof may also be made of specific instances
of his conduct.
67 Character is circumstantially relevant when it is
used for the purpose of suggesting an inference that the
person acted on the occasion in question consistently
with his character. Examples include evidence of a
nonviolent disposition. to prove that the person was
not the aggressor in an affray, or evidence of honesty
to disprove a charge of theft. Character is not circum-
relate to defendant's general reputation in the
community- or, when proper, m is place of
business.69 The witness is not ordinarily permitted
to testify concerning- his own opinon of the de-
fendant, nor about any specific deeds or acts that
exemplify 'the character traits under considera-
tion.70
Since "character evidence" is essentially reputa-
tion evidence, it is necessary to prepare the char-
acter, witness to insure the admissibility of his
testimony; the witness must comprehend that he
is not being asked for his own personal evaluation
or opinion of the defendant, 71 , but rather for- that
of the community.
After the defendant has placed his character in
issue the prosecution may rebut by cross-exam ina-
tion or reputation evidence to the contrary.n Thus,
stantially relevant if the character itself is an- element
of a crime, claim, or defense. Rather, this type of char-
acter is referred to as "character in issue." Illustrative
of this category ii the chastity of the victim under a
statute requiring her chastity as an element of. the
crime of seduction. -See McCo~mcK §§154, 155.
. 18See, e.g., Henson v. State, 239 Ark. 727j 131, 393
S.W.2d 856, 859 (1965) (community or neighborhood);
People v. DeMario, 112 II.App.2d 175, 189, 251 N.E.2d
267, 274 (1969) (association with neighbors and friends);
State v. Oliver, 247 La. 729, 745, 174 So.2d 509, 514(1965) (among his neighbors).
69 See, e.g., United States v. White, 225 F.Supp. 515,
522 (D.D.C. 1963) (community includes where a man
works, worships, shops, relaxes, and lives); Cosler v.
Norwood, 97 Cal.App.2d 665, 667, 218 P.2d 800, 801
(1950) (reputation evidence may be confined to the
vicinity of one's place of business or among the mem-
hers of a restricted group of persons). But see Arterburn
v. State, 216 Tenn. 240, 253, 391 S.W.2d 648, 654
(1965) (within trial court's discretion to refuse testi-
mony of defendant's reputation among his fellow work-
ers where eleven witnesses had already testified of his
reputation in the community).70See S. GAPaD, fItiNois EVmENCE MA-UAL 118
(1963):
Evidence of specific acts is not permissible because
of the risk of unfair surprise, undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, and undue consumpti6n of
time involved in proving character by collateral
events, when character is not, under the plead-
ings, an issue in the case.
See also 1 WIG Hopy §57.71 See Ams.EmDAi §405:
The response of the inadequately prepared char-
acter witness--"Have I heard? I know the defend-
ant. He's as honest.. ."-is usually good for some
courtroom humor, but does the defendant no good.
The witness simply gets into a wrangle with thejudge, and the value of the exercise is lost.72 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 479 (1948); Gross v. United States, 394 F.2d 216,
219 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Reed, 376 F.2d
226, 228 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Harris, 331
F.2d 185, 188 (4th Cir. 1964); People v. Lewis, 25 Ill.
2d 442, 444, 185 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1962). The general
rule is that it is improper for counsel for, the prosecu-
tion in his argument to the jury to comment on the
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if a defendant has exlnnite overwhelmingly -poor
character, counsel sh6uld avoid offering character
evidence; but moderately undesirable character
should iot automatically dismiss consideration of
the issue.N
In the federal practice as well as in many states
the permissible scope of cross-examination of the
character witnesses is extremely broad, often en;
compassing inquiry into prior convictions and
specific incidents such as arrests, adverse' news-
paper reports, fights, complaints to the police, and
unsavory comments -or rumors7 In other states,
the permissible's~ope of cross-examination is much
more limited.7 5 Because a character witness must be
made aware of the type" of cross-examination he
will receive, counsel should prepare him for cross'i
examination as well as-for direct examination, par-
ticularly'as to whether he "has heard" of certain
bad character -attributable to the defendant, and
whether he would be able to maintain his positive
testimony in the face of such bad character as the
prosecutor will raise.
Counsel must recognize that the prosecutor can
failure of the accused to produce evidence of his good
character. See, e.g. Middleton v. United States, 49
F.2d 538, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1951); Dee v. State, 388
S.W.2d 946, 947 (Tex. Crim. 1965).
73 See BAILEY §210:
The fact that a defendant's character may not be
desirable should not deter counsel from humaniz- 
ing him. There is some good in all people. Find
that good and display it to the jury.
However, the defendant's character should not
be whitewashed. Defects must be faced, but thejury should be told that they must do justice with-
out regard to background, race or past record.
Evidence of the defendant's good character is a
vital-part of the defense. Therefore, such evidence
should be stressed in summation.
It is particularly noteworthy in White Collar
cases that a good reputation is enough to create a
reasonable doubt where otherwise a reasonable
doubt might not exist.74See, e g Michelson v. United States, 335 U-S.
469 (1948) 6umors; arrests); United States v. Long-
fellow, 406 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1969) (rumors); United
States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1968)(pending prosecution); United States v. Stringi, 378
F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 1967) (testimony at earlier trial);
United States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir.
1967) (newspaper articles); State v. Earley, 192 Kan.
144, 148, 386 lP.2d 221, 224-25 (1963) (criminal
offenses); McGowen v. State, 221 Tenn. 442, 451, 427
S.W.2d 555, 559 (1968) (forfeiture of bond).75 See, e.g., United States v. Wooden, 420 F.2d 251,
253 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (convictions unrelated to reputa-
tion in question); Aaron v. United States, 397 F.2d
584, 585 (5th Cir. 1968) (illicit affairs); Travis v. United
States, 347 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1957) (plea of the
fifth amendment); People v. Myers, 94 1l. App. 2d
340, 350, 236 N.E.2d 786, 791 (1968) (particular acts
of bad conduct); People v. Eli, 66 Cal. 2d 63, 78, 56
Cal. Rptr. 916, 926, 424 P.2d 356, 366 (1967) (rumor).
become a de tacto Witness on cross-examination by
leading the character witness with "have you
heard" auestions. In the event that there is a
specific conviction or other incident which defense
counsel anticipates will be 'raised upon cross"
examination -of his character witness, he may seek a
ruling prior to trial which Would exclude such
cross-examination in the event that characte"
witnesses are called to testify. 6 Counsel should also
realize that the character witness who is informed
of defendant's previous criminal conviction in the
course of trial preparation does mot risk perjury
for answering a ."have you heard" qtuestion nega-'
tively, for "have you heard', means "have you
heard in the community." 7
In preparing the witness, counsel must be as:
sured that'the witness is able to definesuch words
as "veracity," "integrity" and "character," 7'fo?
the prosecution's cross-examination may attempt
to discredit the testimony by showing that the
witness does not know the meaning of the worcs.
to which.he is testifying.7 9
76 See AirsTExanar § 405:
Where counsel thinks that the prosecutor may use
this approach,"he may ask the prosecutor his inten-
tions at sidebar, before he puts on character wit-
nesses; and may ask the court to rule on the
question. whether a given arrest or conviction
identified by the prosecutor may be inquired about
on cross, if the character witness testifies to the
trait of x. Since the witness' testimony will be in the
standard form, the courts should have no trouble
in giving an advance advisory ruling. The cross-
examination must be disallowed if (a) the arrest
or conviction does not relate to the character
trait in question, or (b) the prosecutor has no
sound basis in fact for asserting that there was an
arrest or conviction. In his discretion, the trial
judge may also disallow it as incommensurately
prejudicial.
See generally Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (judicial discretion based upon the nature of
prior convictions, the length of criminal record, and the
age and circumstances of the defendant).77See AmsTERDAm § 405.78 L GoLnsTEiN & F. LANE, 3 Golnsrsw TRmr
TcE NiQuEs § 20.71 (1969) [hereinafter cited as GoLr-
STEIN].79 CoRNErus, at 103-04, illustrates the dramatic
effect of a cross-examination as to simple definitions of
words such as "veracity" and "character." This tactic
is especially successful where the witness is not of suffi-
cient intelligence to comprehend basic definitions or
inarticulate. The consequences of the following example
used by Cornelius could have been avoided by ade-
quate preparation by defense counsel:
Q. "You have stated that the reputation of this
witness for truth and veracity is bad?"
A. "Yes." (With much emphasis.)
Q. "Will you please define for the benefit of the
jury, the word 'veracity'?"
A. (Here the witness shuffled uneasily in his seat
and hesitated.) "I answered that I knew his reputa-
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The properly prepared character witness can be
examined in four basic steps. First, the witness'
credibility and competence should be established
through questions concerning his personal back-
ground. The witness should recount in detail his
personal education and work background, his
marital status and number of children, positions
of honor and trust in the community, and the like.
This opening portion of the testimony is designed
to establish the witness in the eyes of the jury as a
responsible and respected member of the com-
munity. Further, it permits the witness to over-
come the initial trauma of testifying, and allows
him to be more at ease, and therefore more con-
vincing, in responding to the pertinent questions
which follow.
Secondly, counsel should establish the witness'
contact with and knowledge of the defendant.
While the character witness does not testify re-
garding his own personal opinion of the defendant,
it is nevertheless necessary to show that the witness
has known the defendant for a sufficient length of
time. This portion of the testimony should describe
the witness' first meeting with defendant, the
circumstances of that encounter, the frequency and
occasions for their contact, the witness' knowledge
of the defendant's family, visits to one another's
home, their business dealings, and the like. It may
be desirable to show the proximity of habitation
between the defendant and the witness; the jury
will anticipate that a person hears more discussion
concerning a neighbor than he does of a party living
across town.
To embellish the witness' acquaintance with the
defendant's reputation, it should be shown, if pos-
sible, that both resided in the same community for
tion for truth was bad, but I am not sure that I
know what veracity means."Q. "But you swore that his reputation was bad
both for truth and veracity, did you not?"
A. "Yes, sir."
Q. "And you swore that his reputation was bad
for veracity without knowing the meaning of the
word?"
A. (Witness very uneasy, by this time, and
considerably flushed, did not answer.)Q. "And, therefore, not knowing the meaning
of the word, you could not know whether or not
you were telling the truth?"
A. "I guess that's so."
Q. "And so you do not know whether or not you
told the truth when you said his reputation was
bad for truth and veracity?"
A. "In so far as veracity is concerned."
Of course, when the prosecution calls witnesses to rebut
character, this tactic may be employed by defense
counsel
a reasonable length of time,8' or, where applicable,
that the defendant has been employed or carried
on his business or profession for a length of time
sufficient to indicate an established reputation.
Furthermore, the witness should establish that his
conception of the defendant's reputation is not
based on the remote past, for character testimony
is inadmissible if pertaining to a period of time too
remote from the event in question."
During this portion of the testimony, the im-
partiality of the witness should be expressly shown
and not left for the prosecution to shape on cross
examination. For this reason, relatives, business
associates, and persons with an interest in the out-
come of the litigation are not persuasive character
witnesses.
The third area of concentration concerns ques-
tioning regarding the witness' knowledge of the
defendant's reputation. This testimony depends
upon the witness' having discussed the defendant's
reputation with others in the community. Frequent
contact between the witness and parties knowing
the defendant establishes the basis for testimony as
to reputation and transcends personal opinion.
The number of such discussions is a focal point of
the testimony. The witness should be prepared to
relate, on cross-examination, several specific in-
stances in which the defendant's reputation for the
characteristics at issue was actually discussed with
other members of the community. Positive answers
under cross-examination cannot be secured without
adequate preparation, for it is seldom that a wit-
ness called to the stand unprepared can recall the
names of more than one or two persons with whom
he has discussed defendant's reputation. The
dangers in failing to prepare a character witness
are apparent from the following:
The prosecutor will ask the character witness,
first, to limit himself to the precise character trait
he is speaking about--"honesty"--and to tell the
court the names of some people with whom he has
discussed the trait of the defendant, and how it
came to be discussed. This will not be easy for the
unprepared witness because, thinking under pres-
80 See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478
(1948).
81 Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641, 644 (D.C.
Cir. 1965) (reputation in a different town three years
prior to time of alleged crime too remote); People v.
Gonzales, 66 Cal. 2d 482,500,58 Cal.Rptr. 361, 373,426
P.2d 929, 941 (1967) (reputation seven years before
acts in question too remote); State v. May 93 Idaho
343, 461 P.2d 126, 129 (1969) (reputation three years
before crime not too remote).
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sure, he is likely to give narrow range to the con-
cept of "honesty" and also to be trying to remem-
ber specific occasions on which explicit conversa-
tional reference was made to this trait-which will
have been precious rare. The witness will therefore
falter somewhat. The prosecutor will then move in
with the question on how many occasions the wit-
ness has discussed this specific trait of the de-
fendant, that he can specifically recall. Thinking
literally and once stung, the witness will estimate
conservatively. Not aware that he is likely to be
disqualified if he answers that he has discussed the
trait less than a dozen times, or with a considerable
number of persons, the witness will say "five or six
times, maybe" and be out of court. There is no need
for this problem to arise.P
Once the witness has positively demonstrated
that he is cognizant of defendant's reputation,
counsel can move to the fourth and final step in
the examination of a character witness-testimony
concerning the defendant's reputation. In prepara-
tion for this stage of the testimony the character
witness should be told that his most important
moment on the witness stand will come when he is
asked to state the defendant's reputation for
relevant character traits. He should be urged to
give a spontaneous, emphatic and enthusiastic
response and should be advised that if he gets an
opportunity, he should, without appearing over-
anxious, relate one or two sentences in support of
his general complimentary conclusions about the
defendant's reputation. For example, when the
witness is asked to testify to the defendant's repu-
tation for honesty and integrity, he can say: "It is
excellent. He is one of the most highly respected
men in our town," or, 'It is of the highest. He is
known to be a man of honesty in all his business
dealings."
82 AuisRDAUA § 405. Continuing, Professor Amster-
dam explains counsel's burden in ameliorating the
consequences of destructive cross-examination by
proper preparation:
Counsel must make the witness understand that
people are talking about "honesty" under a lot of
other names when they talk about the defendant,
and also when they act toward the defendant in
ways that express confidence and trust in him.
Counsel should elicit specific instances from the
witness and give him confidence that he is on sound
ground in recalling that the general sense of the
community is that the defendant is honest. If the
witness is left with the recollection of a half-dozen
names with which to respond to the prosecutor's
question to name names, he will be all right. The
important thing is that he does not fluster, and
that he continues to assert with confidence that he
has discussed the defendant's honesty often.
This testimony best comes spontaneously from
the witness rather than from the suggestion of
counsel. Counsel's role is to suggest to the witness
that such an extra sentence or two be added if the
opportunity arises, and that the witness should be
urged to reflect upon what he will say when the
time arrives.
Many jurisdictions allow the reception of reputa-
tion testimony based upon the absence of report of
bad reputation rather than upon knowledge of af-
firmative good reputation. It must be shown, how-
ever, that any misconduct on the part of the
defendant, if existent, would have been known in
the community, and that the witness would have
heard expressions of bad character had they been
circulatedPn The doctrine admitting such evidence
is predicated on the theory that good reputation is
unlikely to excite discussion. Consequently, there
exists a presumption that a defendant's reputation
is good for lack of bad qualities to discuss.
Since the number of witnesses who have not
heard of bad reputation is ordinarily plentiful,
counsel should prepare a limited number of the
better qualified witnesses. However, in the small
class of cases where a number of viewpoints are
necessary to establish character from different
perspectives, counsel must be prepared to combat
the court's discretionary limitation of the number
of character witnesses." Objection to the court's
limitation should be made when the number of
allowable witnesses is announced rather than after
the examination of a few witnesses5 5 Objection
83 See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 478 (1948); Gravitt v. State, 220 Ga. 781, 787,
141 S.E.2d 893, 898 (1965); State v. Cavener, 356 Mo.
602, 612, 202 S.W.2d 869, 875 (1947); State v. Peterson,
100 Utah 413, 421-22, 174 P.2d 843, 847 (1946). Some
courts have even held this type of evidence to be the
very best that could possibly be shown. See, e.g., People
v. Stennett, 51 Cal.App. 370, 197 P. 372 (1921).54United States v. Baysek, 212 F.2d 446, 447 (3d
Cir. 1954) (limitation of seven character witnesses in an
extortion case not an abuse of discretion); State v.
Stewart, 179 Kan. 445, 453, 296 P.2d 1071, 1076 (1956)(limitation of four character witnesses in a murder
case not an abuse of discretion); Woods v. Common-
wealth, 305 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Ky. 1957) (no abuse of
discretion in refusing to limit the number of character
witnesses introduced by the prosecution, and permitting
eight to testify); Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889-90
(Miss. 1968) (defendant accused of rape limited to
eleven character witnesses where the prosecution did
not challenge the defendant's character); State v. De-
maree, 362 S.W.2d 500, 505-06 (Mo. 1962) (defendant
charged with murder limited to four character witnesses
where the prosecution did not vigorously cross-examine
them).85 See, e.g., Holliston Mills of Tennessee v. McGuffin,
177 Tenn. 1, 20, 146 S.W.2d 357, 359 (1941).
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may be grounded upon the theory that character
evidence is of such overwhelming materiality that
the imposition of a limitation would under the
circumstances of the case, be an abuse of discre-
tion.86 Appellate reversal for an abuse of discretion
in the limitation of character witnesses is highly
circumscribed and will be achieved only where ap-
pellant can demonstrate substantial prejudice.P
In light of possible limitations on the number of
character witnesses to be presented, the selection
process takes on increased importance. In choosing
the better witnesses, counsel should select those
who are most articulate and are neither related to
the defendant nor interested in the outcome of the
litigation. It is better to obtain a cross-section
rather than have witnesses of the same profession
or social interest. While the witness' position in the
community must be of sufficient eminence to
command the respect and confidence of the jury,
the display attributes of the witness should not be
given more weight in the selection process than his
knowledge of the defendant's reputation. That is
not to say, however, that the witness' personal
characteristics and station in life are of no impor-
tance. Character witnesses should be expressive,
sympathetic to the jury, and likable. Individual-
ity of character is desirable if the jury is not to be
bored in the course of examination. 88
A discussion of character witnesses would be in-
complete without a discussion of the methods of
attacking the credibility of the prosecution's at-
tempt to establish the character to fit the crime. It
86 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480
(1948). See, e.g., Petersen v. United States, 268 F.2d 87,
88 (1959) (abuse of discretion to restrict defendant
charged with income tax evasion to one character wit-
ness when the sole defense is lack of wilful intent);
Commonwealth v. Streuber, 185 Pa.Super. 369, 373,
137 A.2d 825, 827 (1958) (limitation of only one char-
acter witness is an abuse of discretion); Commonwealth
ex rd. Davis v. Malbon; 195 Va. 368, 376-77, 78 S.E.2d
683, 688 (1953) (allowing forty-three character wit-
nesses is unreasonable exercise of discretion).
87 Cope v. State, 23 Okla.Crim. 161, 166-67, 213
P. 753, 754-55 (1923) (a fixed rule which arbitrarily
limited the number of character witnesses that could
testify to a particular issue precluded the exercise of
discretion); Campbell v. Campbell, 30 R.I. 63, 73-74,
73 A. 354, 358-59 (1909). (As a condition to adjourn-
ment, the trial court required counsel to state the names
of witnesses to be called the next morning, which would
be pretty rigidly followed. Refusal of the court to per-
mit a material witness who had not been expressly
named to be called was an abuse of discretion, and re-
versible error.) The reviewing court seldom finds the
discretionary limitation of the trial court to be erro-
neous, and if error is found, it usually is not reversable
error when considered alone. See cases cited in note 86,
supra.
8See AmsTEzDAm § 405.
is not uncommon for a prosecution witness to 'be
friendly with the defendant, but compelled by cir-
cumstances to testify against him. When this
occurs, defense counsel may on cross-examination
or, where applicable, by subpoena as part of the de-
fense case, use this same -witness to establish good
reputation. This will not only nullify the adverse
testimony but also have a powerful psychological
effect on the jury.s"
Typically, people are hesitant to take the stand
and attack the character of another unless actuated
by enmity. If the defense counsel' concludes that
such is the case with regard to a character witness
for the prosecution, he should attempt to bring out
any previous trouble or conflict that the witness
may have had with the defendant. If the jury
discerns personal animosity, it will tend to disre-
gar.d the testimony."
That character evidence is a significant aspect of
an acquittal verdict was recognized by American
novelist James Gould Cozzens who, observing the
reactions of juries, noted that if the defendant's
"reputation and presence were good, he was pre-
sumed to be innocent; if they were bad, he was pre-
sumed to be guilty. If the law presumed differently,
89 See GoLnsTEiN § 20.74.
"o CoRNELrus, at 104, notes that almost invariably
such a witness will at first deny any ill feeling toward
the defendant. Upon competent. questioning, however,
he will probably admit some friction or trouble with the
defendant, but will attempt to minimize it. Cornelius
demonstrates how this individual could be successfully
cross-examined:
On direct examination, he had testified that the
reputation of X was bad for truth and veracity.
The cross-examination then proceeded as follows:Q. "You are a bitter enemy of X are you not?"
(The question was made as extreme as possible to
draw a denial.)
A. "No, sir."
Q. "But you are an enemy of his just the same?"
A. "No, sir, I am not."
Q. "Are you on friendly terms with him?"
A. "I have nothing against him."
Q. "That was not the question. I asked you are
you on friendly terms with X?"
A. "Yes, sir."
Q. "Then, am I to understand that you are a
friend of X?"
A. "Well, yes."
Q. "Were you subpoenaed to come here and tes-
tify against X?"
A. "No."
Q. (Sarcastically.) "You came as a friend?"
A. "I came because Y asked me to come."
Q. "But you came voluntarily?"
A. "Yes, sir."
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the law presumed alone. '"' Character evidence
pres s, upon the juror's humanistic sensitivity.
Equally effective evidence, pressing upon their in-
tellectual sophistication rather than their senti-
ment, can be generated by the use of scientific
and demonstrative evidence.
SCrENTriIc AND DEmoNSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
There are many cases in which the defense can
make profitable and imaginative use of demon-
strative and scientific evidence. Counsel may find
it helpful to use demonstrative evidence such as
diagrams, charts, blackboards, photographs, maps
or similar physical objects to illustrate and eluci-
date testimony on the defense theory. However, if
the theory requires scientific evidence in the form
of testimony of pathologists, psychiatrists,9 2 bal-
listics experts, accountants and the like, an ef-
fective, comprehensible presentation often requires
that the testimony of the expert witness be ex-
plained with visual aids.
Although much of the testimony of an expert
increases the factual premises from which the jury
can make inferences, the expert's services are most
forcefully utilized when counsel elicits from him a
statement of opinion or series of conclusions re-
sulting from a clear course of reasoning. 3 The
reasoning process should be most clearly developed,
for those on the jury are not swayed by mere as-
sertions of factual conclusions but are anxious to
understand; and frequently, to understand is to be
convinced.
9 4
Because of the strong impression that the proper
use of expert testimony will have upon the jury,
counsel will often find it necessary to argue for the
admission or exclusion of testimony, so that some
knowledge of the pertinent rules of evidence is re-
quired. Rules of evidence were developed to
protect the jury from being misled and to keep
:1 J. COZZENS, TEm JUST AND THE UNJUST 57 (1942).
2 For illustrations of the direct and cross examina-
tons of psychologists and psychiatrists in a case in
which the defense of insanity at the time of the crime
was successfully interposed, see Sullivan & Winger,
The Insanity Defense Psychological and Psychiatric
Testimony, 7 Txr r. LAwxpas' GuIDE, Nov., 1963 at 53.
9 Cf. People v. Martin, 87 Cal. App. 2d 581, 584, 197
P.2d 379, 380 (1948) ("Expert evidence is really an
argument of an expert to the court, and is valuable only
in regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the
reasons advanced for the conclusions. The weight to be
given to the opinion of an expert depends on the reasons
he assigns to support that opinion").
- 94See Osbom, Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Tes-
timony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1935); 4 BusH
§ 477.9 5Sometines defense attorneys make objections
simply to break the continuity of a cogently reasoned
their consideration within the matters at issue.9 6
An elementary exclusionary principle is the opinion
rule. According to Professor .Wigmore the true
theory of this rule is not that there is any fault or
insufficiency in the witness' impression, but simply
that his "testimony is superfluous. The rule simply
endeavors to save time and avoid confusing testi-
mony by telling the witness: "The tribunal is on
this subject in possession of the same materials for
judgment as yourself; thus, as you can add nothing
to our materials for judgment, your further testi-
mony is unncessary, and merely cumbers the
proceedings." 7
However, the opinion rule does not operate to
exclude the conclusions drawn by the expert, 98 who
is by hypothesis speaking from experience or edu-
cation9 9 because his opinion is helpful to the jury.
On the other hand, if the inferences can be made
by the jury without assistance, an expert's opinion
thereon should also be excluded. A practical test
has been aptly stated:
. .. [T]here is no more certain test for determining
when experts may be used than the common sense
inquiry whether the untrained layman would be
qualified to determine intelligently and to the best
possible degree the particular issue without enlight-
enment from those having a specialized under-
standing of the subject involved in the dispute.
Whenever the triers of fact are confronted with
issues which cannot be determined intelligently on
the basis of ordinary judgment and practical expe-
rience gained through the usual affairs of life, the
benefit of scientific or specialized knowledge or ex-
perience may be provided:1 09
testimony. For a case reversing because of the constant
trivial objections, see Venuto v..Lizzo, 148 App. Div.
164, 132 N.Y.S. 1066 (1911).
91 For an excellent summary of the development of
the rules of evidence pertaining to the use of expert tes-
timony, see Rosenthall, The Development of the Use of
Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEM'P. P oB. 403
(1935). See also 7 WiGmo § 1917.
9Id. at § 1918.9 9An expert has been defined as "one who is skilled
in any particular art, trade or profession, being in pos-
session of peculiar knowledge concerning the same."
H. RoGERs, EXPERT Txsrnoo 2 (3rd ed. 1941).
91 McCormick states that to warrant the use of ex-
pert's inferences two elements are required: 1) "the
subject of the inference must be so distinctly related to
some scence, profession, business or occupation as to
be beyond the ken of the average layman, and 2) the
witness must have such skill, knowledge or experience
in that field or calling as to make it appear that his
opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his
search for truth." McCormick, Some Observations Upon
the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 TaxAs L.
Rlv. 109, 121 (1944).109 Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAN. L. R1v. 414,418(1952).
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In addition, courts generally limit the scope of an
expert's testimony by sustaining objections to
questions attempting to elicit opinions on facts
determinative of the "ultimate issue" in order to
prevent the witness from usurping the jury's func-
tion.' 0' Wigmore attacked this line of reasoning by
contending that the jury is at all times free to re-
ject the expert's opinion.' 2 He felt that the exclu-
sion of expert testimony at the point when the jury
was most in need of assistance unfairly obstructed
the presentation of the case and left the jury an
incompetent trier.1
3
In People v. Wilson' 114 a California abortion
prosecution, complainant's personal physician was
permitted to testify that he found his patient's
cervix effaced and that, in his opinion, an abortion
was induced by outside causes. Further expert
opinion by the doctor, advising that his patient's
past history indicated no necessity for a therapeutic
abortion, rebutted the defendant's only defense.
Affirming the ensuing conviction, Justice Traynor
rejected appellant's '"ltimate issue" contention:
There is no hard and fast rule that the expert
cannot be asked a question that coincides with the
ultimate issue in the case, "We think the true rule
is that admissibility depends on the nature of the
issue and the circumstances of the case, there being
a large element of judicial discretion involved....
Oftentimes an opinion may be received on a simple
ultimate issue, even when it is the sole one, as for
example where the issue is the value of an article,
or the sanity of a person; because it cannot be
further simplified and cannot be fully tried without
hearing opinions from those in better position to
form them than the jury can be placed in." [cita-
tions omitted] In the present case there was no
other practicable way of framing the questions if
they were to serve the purpose of obtaining the
101 Evidence is composed of fact and opinion, and
their relationship varies with relevancy. As irrelevance
is approached opinions may be very general, but as the
issues become more relevant courts demand details
rather than opinion. Thus "the admissibility of any
opinion depends upon two factors: 1) its degree of gen-
erality and 2) its decisiveness of the case. A witness may
make a very general statement (an opinion) and have it
called a statement of fact if it is not decisive of the case
or does not approach decisiveness of the case. He may
not make a very specific statement if such statement is
capable of being made more specific and is decisive of
the case or approaches such decisiveness." W. KING &
D. PiLLiNGER, OPINIoN EvmmicE IN IIurOios, 10-12
(1942). See also McCormick, supra note 99, at 115;
Note, Opinion Testimony and Ultimate Issue, 51 Ky.
L.J. 540 (1963).
102 7 WomoREo § 1920.
l3 Id. at § 1921.
04 25 Cal.2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944).
benefit of the witness's expert knowledge as to mat-
ters on which enlightenment of the jury by the ex-
pert was proper.100
Notwithstanding limited acceptance of the ulti-
mate issue doctrine, a question couched in terms of
a legal standard or conclusion calling for an opinion
beyond an ultimate fac in issue will not be al-
lowed.100
Faced with a related issue concerning the proper
means of eliciting expert testimony, the Wilson
court stated: "The method of obtaining opinion
evidence from an expert by hypothetical questions
is unsatisfactory, but it is at present the least ob-
jectionable known to the law." 107 The hypothetical
question has been criticized because it often creates
more confusion than understanding for both the
witness and the jury. 0 8 Its use, however, is neces-
sary to elicit an opinion from an expert who has no
personal knowledge of the facts' °9 Since his opinion
necessarily involves the consideration of premises,
it follows that if the expert is not aware of the
105 People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341, 346, 153 P.2d
720, 725 (1944). In People v. Martinez, 38 Cal.2d 556,
241 P.2d 224 (1952), justice Traynor again stated:
"Defendant's argument is based upon the erroneous
assumption that an expert cannot be asked a question
that coincides with the ultimate issue."
106 Koester v. Commonwealth, 449 S.W.2d 213 (Ky.
1969) (psychiatrist's opinion as to defendant's specific
intent to detain two girls with intent to have sexual
intercourse was inadmissible); State v. Augustine, 252
La. 983, 215 So.2d 634 (1968) (doctor's testimony that
defendant met the "legal standard for present sanity"
was an invasion of the jury's province). But cf. State v.
Miller, 254 Iowa 545, 117 N.W.2d 447 (1962) (doctor's
opinion that prosecutrix had been "forcibly raped" was
sustained, the court holding that "rape" was not used
in its legal context).
101 People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341, 345, 153 P.2d
720, 724 (1944).
1'0 See Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in Probate
Proceedings, 2 &LAw CONTEro. PROB. 448, 455 (1935)
("But the present practice of misusing the hypothetical
question as restatement of the case to reimpress the
jury is bad strategy, though good tactics; bad strategy
because it is so unfair, confusing and degrading that it
does not clarify the issue nor help achieve justice");
2 WGmoR § 686 ("The hypothetical question, misused
by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has in practice
led to an intolerable obstruction of trth.... [Ilt has
artificially clamped the mouth of the expert, so that the
answer to a complex question may not express his actual
opinion on the actual case...").
10 The hypothetical question may also be used as a
summary question directed toward an expert who has
personally examined the subject in question, but this is
merely a technique which is not necessitated by the
rules of evidence. State v. Boiardo, 111 NJ. Super. 219,
268 A.2d 55 (1970) (long hypothetical question was sus-
tained over attack that it permitted the state to sum-
marize its entire case). See also 2 WIoPoRE § 675;
4 Bush § 477; Sullivan & Winger, supra note 92, at 158.
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premises from his own observation, they must be
presented to him hypothetically" °
The practioner's art in presenting the hypotheti-
cal question involves the arrangement of the
premises; the evidentiary rules focus on the scope
of their manipulation. Theoretically, the hypothet-
ical is an attempt to furnish the jury with an
account of the premises upon which the conclusion
is based. In order to avoid misleading the jury, the
premises must not include data which does not
countenance a fair possibility of jury acceptance,"'
but an opinion on any combination of favorable
facts is permissible. 2 It is the jury's task to
examine the truth of the premises as well as the
validity of the conclusions.
The effect of a hypothetical question can, how-
ever, be derogated by its vulnerability to cross ex-
amination because it allows the opposing counsel
to introduce doubt into the premises as well as the
conclusions."3 By culling certain facts and partially
110 See 2 WiossoRE § 676. Some courts allow the ex-
pert to draw conclusions from the facts that have been
previously introduced, leaving it to the cross examiner
to elicit the exact premises which the witness had in
mind. In such a jurisdiction it is effective trial practice
to have, for instance, the family doctor testify as to
findings and then ask the "super-expert" for his con-
clusion. See Ladd, supra note 100, at 422; McCormick,
supra note 99, at 125. But cf. Allen v. State, 234 Md.
366,199 A.2d 237, where a question propounded by the
trial court asking whether, based on all examinations
and what he heard in court that day, the doctor was
able to say if defendant could distinquish between right
and wrong, was excluded by reviewing court because
the failure to state premises with reasonable particu-
larity was confusing to the jury.
1112 WiGmoRE § 692. See, e.g., State v. Tyler, 77
Wash.2d ---, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), where a doctor was
not permitted to testify hypothetically as to the effect
drugs had on the defendant because the facts in the
record concerming the kinds, quantities, strength and
intervals of taking the drugs was vague and uncertain.
Cf. People v. Muniz, 31 1l.2d 130, 198 N.E.2d 855
(1964), where an objection to a hypothetical question
was properly sustained even though the fact embraced
within the question eventually appeared in evidence
because, at the time the question was asked, no evi-
denciary support existed for facts assumed.
112See, e.g., People v. Yonder, 44 Ill.2d 376, 256
N.E.2d 321 (1969), where the prosecution, while at-
tempting to prove defendant's sanity, included in its
hypothetical the facts attending the offense but omitted
defendant's history and other symptoms of insanity.
The court held that although a party may include only
proved facts, the prosecution was not bound to include
all of the evidence upon the issue.
"3In State v. Bertone, 39 N.J. 356, 188 A.2d 599
(1963), a doctor responded favorably to the defense's
hypothetical asking whether defendant's past history of
schizophrenic paranoia could be activated by the dis-
covery, upon returning from the army, of a man under
his wife's bed. However, this testimony was vitiated
when prosecutor introduced the possibility that de-
fendant was deluding the presence of the man under the
stating previous testimony, opposing counsel can
confuse the jury and spoil a forceful argument. In
short, the hypothetical question lacks a fortified
unity. If the advocate has the opportunity to con-
sult and to prepare his witness, the hypothetical
question should be subordinated to tactics which
more effectively amplify and protect the reasoning
process. By drawing the premises, conclusions and
rationale from the expert, the jury is presented
with one complete thought that can only be at-
tacked from the forefront.
Courtroom accomplishments of this type are
predicated upon effective out of court preparation.
In preparing the expert witness, it is essential that
counsel fully and fairly explain to the expert all
relevant facts, review with the expert his evidenti-
ary conclusions, and ask for assistance in formulat-
ing a scientific theory which will be the basis of
direct examination. Imperatively, counsel must
anticipate prejudicial facts that may be disclosed
during cross-examination. Thus, counsel is advised
to become familiar with the literature in the par-
ticular field and to have carefully studied all books
and articles that may have been written by the
expert. If any possible inconsistencies should ap-
pear between the expert's publications and the
contemplated theory of the case, the matters
should be fully discussed. If they cannot be har-
monized, another expert should be chosen. Counsel
should also determine whether the expert is famil-
iar with the authorities in his profession, for it is
likely that his qualification will be tested on cross
examination by his knowledge of the authorities."4
Satisfied that the expert is qualified, counsel
should discuss the substance of the direct examina-
tion with his witness. Again, counsel should fully
relate the facts, his theory, and its relation to the
determination of the case. If the expert is made
aware of the exact facts and issues he may be able
to conduct experiments to supplement his testi-
mony with physical proof"5 or, significantly, be in
bed. Sustaining the conviction, the reviewing court
held that on cross examination opposing counsel can
reframe the hypothetical or ask the expert whether his
opinion would change if one or more of the material
facts assumed conformed to the cross examiner's ver-
sion of what the true facts are.
114 See 4 Busu § 471; Stichter, A Praditioner's Guide
to the Use of Exhibits and Expert Testimony, 8 Omo
ST. U.L.J. 295, 309 (1942).
"'5The admissibility of a particular experiment or
scientific technique is based upon its general acceptance.
In Frye v. United States 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1910),
the court held that the lie detector test was not admis-
sible and stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses
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a position to furnish a more appropriate scientific
theory. Counsel's omissions in this regard can be
disastrous.
The Canadian murder trial of Steven Truscott is
illustrative of the dangers inherent in failing to
discuss the scientific defense aspects of a case with
the expert witness." 8 In Truscott the determining
issue was whether the victim had died where she
was found. The defense, attempting to cast doubt
on the place of death, introduced a complicated
lividity theory to illustrate that the position of the
deceased body had changed after she had died.
This momentarily confused the prosecution and
lead it into an even more complicated scientific
refutation involving the process of blood dotting.
However, throughout the testimony of the expert
witnesses neither side had informed the witness
that a pool of blood was found beside the body.
After the prosecution had an opportunity to review
all the evidence, he recalled one of the experts and
asked if blood oozes after death. The answer was
that, in fact, blood does not ooze after the heart
stops beating; thus there was convincing direct
evidence that the victim died where she was found.
Because the defense counsel had not informed his
expert of this simple fact, the entire defense was
destroyed.
Once the theory is established and the expert
witness adequately prepared, counsel must serve as
the conduit between the expert's untoward knowl-
edge and the lay jury. A preliminary essential to
the testimony of an expert witness is, of course,
qualifying him as an expert."7 After the threshold
the line between the experimental and demonstra-
ble stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.
However in United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th
Cir. 1970), the court, citing extensively the support of
the United States Atomic Energy Commission, held
that the "neutron activation analysis" met the test of
"general acceptance in the particular field."
"ISee generally Clendeming, Expert Testimony,
9 Cmua. L. Q. 415 (1967), reiewing the use of expert
testimony in the Truscott murder trial.
17 The qualification of a witness is important in gain-
ing the confidence of the jury. The witness should be ad-
vised to state his qualifications without appearing to be
boasting. See Stichter, supra note 114, at 313. If oppos-
ing counsel is aware of the distinguished qualifications
of the witness, it is a wise tactic to attempt to waive the
qualifications in hopes of minimizing the weight thejury will give to the witness' testimony. 4 BusH § 472.
qualifications are established, counsel must assure
that the jury comprehends each step in the rati-
ocination leading to the expert's conclusion. As-
sistance may be gleaned from the use of diagrams"'
and photographs" 9 to illustrate the testimony. In-
consistencies in the state's evidences can be
dramatically demonstrated through the use of
enlargements.
120
While generally effective, the use of expert wit-
nesses is not without its drawbacks. Should the
expert be informed of any incriminating facts or
become aware of any detrimental information dur-
ing his investigations, it may be wise to refrain
118 When making diagrams it is best to use prepared
charts or large drawing pads, rather than blackboards.
See Henshaw, Use and Abuse of Demonstrative Evidence:
The Art of Jury Persuasion 40 A.B.A.J. 479 (1954).
Ladd, Demonstrative Evidence and Expert Opinion
1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1, 18. Anatomical charts afford an
accurate and easily accessible aid to the explanation of
medical testimony. Cf. Lackey v. State, 215 Miss. 57,
60 So.2d 503 (1952).
"9 To be admissible a photograph must accurately
represent what it purports. There must be no artificial
distortions nor inaccuracy due to the lapse of time.
Although it may be good practice to have the photog-
rapher testify, trial judges oridinarily require only that
a person with personal knowledge verify the accuracy
of the representation. See Ladd, supra note 118, at 11;
3 BUsH § 330. Although enlarged photographs are quite
convenient, counsel should also consider the use of
slides and advanced techniques like infra-red photog-
raphy. See Lay, The Use of Real Evidence, 37 NEB. L.
REv. 501, 506 (1958); Henshaw, supra note 118, at 481.
Also, it is improper to introduce gruesome pictures
which contribute nothing towards solution of eviden-
tiary problems. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 9 Ill.2d 484,
138 N.E.2d 528 (1956) (trial court abused its discretion
in admitting a photograph taken after the autopsy
where the only use of the photograph was to arouse the
emotions of the jury so that they would administer a
more severe penalty).
120 In fingerprint cases the expert using enlarged
photographs can point out differences in the whirls, dots
and papillary ridges between those of the defendant and
those found at the scene of the crime. With the aid of
photographs a ballistic's expert can show that in fact
variation in each gun barrel do leave characteristic
grooves in the softer metal of the bullet. By comparing
photos of the markings on a bullet found at the scene of
the crime with a photo of another bullet shot from the
gun in evidence, the jury will understand the reasons for
believing that the particular gun is not the criminal's
weapon. See Underhill, supra note 40, § 870-73; Ladd,
supra note 118, at 10.
It should, however, be noted that fingerprint and
ballistic's experts are more often employed by the
prosecution than the defense. Where the prosecution's
physical evidence is strong, defense counsel should at-
tempt to show that the chain of evidence between in-
vestigating officer and expert was broken in order to
create a belief in the possibility of tampering. Also as a
prerequisite to introducing testimony, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that there has been no possi-
bility of substitution. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 82 Ohio
L. Abs. 216, 164 N.E.2d 585 (1959).
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from using his testimony. For, once the expert is
called to testify, communications that have been
privileged may become accessible on cross examin-
ation~m On the other hand, if the expert is used
merely as a consultant, counsel must be careful to
protect the privileged status of any incriminating
information.
Although some state statutory protections
exist,"' they are strictly construed and often will
not be sufficient protection against disclosure 23
Many privileges recognized by the states have no
like provision in federal proceedingslu and the
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates125 recognize only three
privileges relating to psychotherapists, trade
secrets and the attorney-client relationship 26
To attempt to avoid these problems, the at-
torney should retain the expert as his agent. Wig-
more states that the communications of the at-
"'1 See, e.g., People v. Givans, 83 Il. App. 2d 423, 228
N.E.2d 123 (1963) (physician-patient privilege waived
where the defendant, in support of an insanity defense,
called his own doctor who had examined him before the
offense); Dani v. United States, 173 A.2d 736 (Mun.Ct.
App.D.C.1961) (defendant's psychiatrist waived priv-
ilege by testifying as to the defendant's inability to
cross examine to explore the underlying basis for the
opinion).
122The physician-patient privilege is recognized by
statute in every state, and many states also include a
separate psychiatrist-patient privilege. For a listing of
all such statutes, see 8 ViGMoR. § 2380. The account-
ant-client privilege is recognized by statute in sixteen
states. For a listing and an analysis of these statutes,
see Note, Privileged Communications-Accountants and
Accounting-A Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client
Privilege Statutes, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1264 (1968).
=See, e.g., Dorfiman v. Rombs, 218 F.Supp. 905(D.D.C. 1963) (accountant's privilege was held to be
available only when invoked by the accountant). Lindsay
v. Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d 60 (1962) (physi-
can's privilege was held inapplicable where the physi-
dan was not consulted for "treatment").
2See United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 985 (1969); Fal-
some v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (no accountant-client pro-
vision exists in the federal system).
5 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
26Rule 5-04, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
(covers a patient who is interviewed for purposes of
diagnosis or treatment, and the provision may be in-
voked by patient or psychotherapist on behalf of pa-
tient).
Rule 5-08, Trade Secrets ("A person has a privilege,
which may be claimed by him or his agent or employee,
to refuse to disclose and to prevent other persons from
disclosing a trade secret owned by him, if the allowance
of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or other-
wise work injustice...").
Rule 5-03, Lawyer-Client Privilege (includes a "rep-
resentative of the lawyer," and, according to the Ad-
visory Committee's Note, an accountant may well fall
in this category).
torney's agent are within the attorney-client
privilege because the attorney's agent is also the
client's subagent and is acting as such for the
client.2l Courts have likewise extended this priv-
ilege, but more perspective opinions have avoided
the agency basis and emphasized both the need for
the expert's consultations and the necessity for
confidentiality if the communications are to be
effective. Thus in State v. Kociolec'lu the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that communications be-
tween an attorney and a scientific expert were
privileged. There the accused's attorney had hired
a psychiatrist to examine the accused and make a
report. When knowledge of this examination came
to the state, the state demanded and received the
report of the expert. It then called the psychiatrist
to the stand, where his testimony touched on
various disclosures made to him by the accused.
The court held that the admission of this testimony
was error, saying, "The lawyer-client privilege is
vain if it does not secure freedom of professional
consultation." 1 9
In United States v. Kovel,1"° the Second Circuit,
by judge Friendly, ruled that communications to
an accountant employed by a law-firm were priv-
ileged. The court analogized the position of the
expert to that of an interpreter, stating that the
accountant is thus necessary for effective counsel-
ing.ln However, Judge Friendly stated that it was
" 8 WiGuonE § 2318. Cf. La Lance and Grosjean
Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563 (S.D.N.Y.
1898), a patent case in which the court held that a
scientific expert can be viewed as an associated counsel
and thus the expert should have the same privilege as
the attorney. The court concluded: "It would seem,
however, that in such a case the privilege should be lost
when the expert ceases to act as counsel, and allows
himself to be made a witness; at least, to the extent to
which he testifies." Id. at 564.
"'23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
12 Id. at 23 N.J. 415, 129 A.2d 425. Cf. People v.
Speck, 41 Ill.2d 171, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968), where the
court held the attorney-client privilege inapplicable be-
cause the expert testimony was limited to opinions as
to fingerprints and there was no testimony as to any
conversation between the witness and the defendant or
defendant's attorney. The court distinguished Kociolik
and said that the privilege is based on the confidential
nature of the communication.
"30 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
"'But cf. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1949), where the court held that the at-
torney-client privilege can be extended to include an
attorney's agent only when that agent is indispensably
necessary in order for the communication to be made to
the attorney and found that the accountant's presence
was not indispensable but merely convenient. However,
in a later case in this same court, citing Kovel, held that
an accountant was hired to advise the attorney and
thus was within the privilege. United States v. Judson,
322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
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vital to the privilege that the communication be
made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
legal advise from a lawyer. Consequently, the
court drew a rather arbitrary line and stated that
if the client communicated with an accountant be-
fore retaining an attorney, the accountant's testi-
mony would not be privileged
2
On the basis of these cases it is suggested that
the expert's testimony will most likely be privileged
as long as he is retained to assist counsel and pro-
vided all interviews are held in the attorney's
presence.'
182 Cf. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1963), where the court held the attorney-client
privilege applicable to an accountant who was retained
by the client upon the advice of the attorney.
"'To avoid some of the problems occasioned by the
use of experts, counsel should retain the expert pursuant
to a written retainer agreement. The following example
used to retain an accountant is illustrative:
We have retained your firm to assist us in pre-
paring for [the trial of-anticipated litigation on
behalf of] our client X. We have retained you to
examine Mr. X's books and records for the years
1970-71, and to report and consult with us con-
cerning your findings. It is to be understood that
you are being retained by our firm and not by Mr.
X, and that our firm will have title to and posses-
sion of all work papers, reports, and other docu-
ments related to the above examination.
All information received by you in this connec-
tion will be kept strictly confidential and will be
disclosed to no one without our express written
consent.
Your charges for the examination herein referred
to are to be made at your regular per diem rates
plus out-of-pocket expenses. All bills will be di-
rected to our firm.
A similar form of written retainer should be prepared
for any expert who may uncover incriminating facts
during the course of his investigation. The expert's
signature accepting the agreement should be obtained
CONCLUSION
Skillful presentation of the defendant's case can-
not be achieved without significant preparation
and analysis by counsel. It is axiomatic that prep-
aration is the quintessence of effective trial work
Because the process of change in the constitutional
criminal area is constantly developing,"' counsel
must keep abreast of recent trends in criminal law
as well as in the tactical art of trial strategy.
Once counsel has elicited a proper balance of
testimony consistent with his defense theory, he
has established a foundation upon which to weave
the isolated fragments of evidence into a convinc-
ing closing argument."35 While recognizing that
"the jury has the power to bring a verdict in the
teeth of both law and facts," 36 adroit counsel can
feel secure that skillful presentation of the de-
fendant's case will not only effectively discharge his
function as an advocate, but will also consistently
result in the foreman's voice filling the quiet court-
room with the words-"not guilty."
before he is given access to the records or the client. It is
preferable that all interviews with the client be held in
the attorney's presence. Should the investigation dis-
close incriminating or troublesome matters, wisdom
may dictate that the attorney exercise his right to as-
sume and retain possession of all of the expert's ma-
terial.
134 See Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 1, 17 (1969)
("While the fourteenth amendment is 100 years old, the
major developments under it which concern the sanc-
tity of the person are almost current events").
135 See generally Martin, Closing Arguments to the
Jury for the Defense of Criminal Cases, 58 J. Camn. L. C.
& P.S. 2 (1967).
13" Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138(1920) (Holmes, J.).
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